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Description: | British civilian engineer worked at Balloon Factory/Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, GB, 1909-1914; worked as general manager of Aircraft Manufacturing Company at Hendon, London, GB, 1914-1919; worked as director with Gloucestershire/Gloster Aircraft Company in GB, 1919-1966
REEL 1 Period at Balloon Factory/Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, 1909-1914: background to appointment as personal assistant to Mervyn O'Gorman; use of tethered balloons for artillery observation; production and storage of hydrogen; construction of balloons and measurement of hydrogen pressure; reliance on French engines and development of RAF 1 engine for airships; question of vulnerability of airships; development of dirigible airships; reaction to cancellation of airship programme; early aircraft experiments of Geoffrey de Haviland and background to his apprenticeship to RAE; prior education in Norwich.
REEL 2 Continues: prior technical education in Manchester; construction of BE1 and BE2; state of British aircraft manufacturers, 1912-1913; role as Technical Assistant in Charge of Supplies in securing weight saving materials for aircraft manufacture; plentiful carpenters; use of dope on canvas; fuel; sale of aircraft to government; story of visit to France to order Henry Farman and engines, 7/1914-8/1914, including restriction placed on their export until British declared war on Germany, success in organising transport to GB and irrelevance of cost. Period as general manager with Aircraft Manufacturing Company at Hendon, London, 1914-1919 and as director of Gloucestershire/Gloster Aircraft Company, 1919-1965: story of visit to France to order Henry Farman and engines, 7/1914-8/1914, including restriction placed on their export until British declared war on Germany, success in organising transport to GB and irrelevance of cost; absence of French technical drawings and consequent use of Maurice Farman as a physical template for manufacture of Farman types in GB; appointment of de Haviland to Aircraft Inspection Department and Burroughes' role in persuading de Haviland to become aircraft designer for AMC; successful negotiations to expand aircraft production capacity with H H Martyn & Company of Cheltenham, 1915.
REEL 3 Continues: successful negotiations to expand aircraft production capacity with H H Martyn & Company of Cheltenham, 1915; Martyn's proposal to form Gloucestershire Aircraft Company with AMC, 1917; David Longden's role in negotiations following government cancellation of GAC contracts, 1919; background to GAC securing order to supply and license production of Nighthawk aircraft for Japanese, 1921; efforts of Hawker Aircraft Company to manufacture motorcycles, 1919-1921; recruitment of H P Folland to GAC, 1921; state of British aircraft manufacturers, 1914; compulsory purchase of land for AMC, 1914; establishment of factory to manufacture Gnome engines in Walthamstow, London, 1914; meeting with Lord Jackie Fisher at Admiralty and importance attached to accelerating airship manufacture for anti-submarine role, 1915; effectiveness of airships in anti-submarine role; problems with airships and opinion of post-war accidents; lack of wartime progress in design and construction of civil passenger aircraft and consequent impact of US DC1 passenger aircraft, 1929; increasing reliability of engines, 1913-1918.
REEL 4 Continues: state of engine manufacturers, 1914; delayed development of Puma engine and consequent use of Rolls Royce Eagle engines in DH4 and DH9; air and water cooled engines; background to Rolls Royce production of aircraft engines including reluctance of Henry Royce, production of Eagle engine, post-war suspension of production and Ernest Hives role in re-starting production, 1931; question of wartime co-operation between aircraft and engine manufacturing companies; impact on fighter speed of jet engines; increase in scout speeds, 1914-1918; inter-war design influences on Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire; aspects of air conflict, 1914-1918, including impact of Fokker DRI and its interrupter gear, aces, bombing, opinion of Sopwith Camel and flying training; unreliability of early aluminium through excess of zinc.
REEL 5 Continues: impact on Government air policy of Chanak crisis, 1922; RAF order for Gloster Grebe fighter with Jaguar air cooled engine, 1923; wing flutter problem which hindered development of Gloster Gamecock; involvement as director in company involved in development of metal construction in aircraft, amalgamation with GAC and consequent subcontracts to manufacture Armstrong Whitworth Siskin and wings for Westland Wapiti, 1927; competition in aircraft manufacturing industry and testing of new designs at Martlesham Heath; effects of introduction of metal construction on costs illustrated by Grebe; replacement of carpenters with engineering fitters; organisation of Ministry of Aircraft Production; question of size of RAF; delivery of aircraft to RAF; revival of Central Flying School.
REEL 6 Continues: involvement in Schneider Trophy race held at Venice, Italy, 1927, including nominated RAF test pilots, method of taking off in seaplanes, history of trophy, competition between GAC biplane and Supermarine monoplane, problems with crankshaft of Napier Lion engines, decision to give modified Lion to Supermarine and their consequent success in race; involvement in Schneider Trophy race held at Calshot, GB, 1928, including private sponsorship of aircraft, attendance, development of Supermarine Spitfire from Seaplane; opinion of Reginald Mitchell, background to subsequent failed attempt recruit him for GAC due to acquisition of Supermarine by Vickers and question of Italian, French and German competition in Schneider Trophy.
REEL 7 Continues: review of world aircraft industry, 1931; sale of license for variable pitch propellers to Japanese, 1929; development skills of Japanese; background to Tom Hamilton's development of two position air screw; question of air requirements of Royal Navy; use of Grebes for deck landing trials; John Cunningham and night flying; story of entertaining Duke of Edinburgh as president of Society of British Aircraft Constructors, 1952; increase in civilian passenger comfort; reasons for absence of parachute on active service, 1914-1918; development of lighter parachutes; concrete landing strips; retractable undercarriages; background to acquirement of GAC by Hawker Company.
REEL 8 Continues: background to acquirement of GAC by Hawker Company and Burroughes continuing role as director, 1934; review of state of German aircraft industry; opinion of Hitler; question of expansion of RAF and negative role of politicians ca 1936-1939; opinion of Churchill and Beaverbrook; role as chairman of Light Alloy Association, 1939-1945; illustrations of policy of promoting amalgamation amongst firms within aircraft industry, 1927-1945; expansion in production of Hawker Hurricanes, 1939-1943; relaxation of Beaverbrook's demands for fighters following end of Battle of Britain, 10/1940; pressure for increase in production of Avro Lancasters and question of merits of bomber offensive on Germany, 1941-1945; question of success of British fighters in Battle of Britain.
REEL 9 Continues: initial problems in mass production of Supermarine Spitfires, 1940; comparison of Spitfire and Hurricane and subsequent improvements; question of effect on workers morale of Battle of Britain and Churchill's speeches; opinion of Beaverbrook; supply of wooden Albemarle transport aircraft to USSR; background to development of Gloster E28/39 by designer George Carter for Frank Whittle's prototype jet engine, 1939-1941; successful test flight of E28/39 at Cranwell, 15/5/1941; initial scepticism concerning jet aircraft from BSoAC, 5/1941; background to Whittle's success in developing jet engine and initial lack of interest from Ernest Hines of Rolls Royce until success of E28/39 test flight.
REEL 10 Continues: initial lack of interest in jet engine from Ernest Hines of Rolls Royce until success of E28/39 test flight; de Haviland role in producing adaptation of Whittle jet engine and use of their Halford Goblin engine for first production models of Gloucester Meteor, 1943; reasons for delays in production of Meteor; lack of priority attached to production of jet aircraft in Germany; increase in speeds and consequent breaking of sound barrier with jet aircraft, 1942; reliability of jet engines; question of priorities in production of successful conventional aircraft and jet aircraft; Italian jet experiments; effects of greater speed on fuselage of early Meteors; question of pilots' opinion of Meteor; effects of Meteors acceleration on pilots; Churchill's reaction to demonstration of E28/39, 1941; consequences of lack of priority attached to production of jet aircraft in Germany; question of studying German V1 and story of Meteor using its wing tip to bring down V1; Watson Watt's success in disrupting German directional control radar for their bombers; question of development of plastics; use of reinforced glass windscreens; formation of Aircraft Research Society, 1952.
REEL 11 Continues: background to construction of experimental wind tunnel of ARS at Bedford; international reputation of ARS; contrasting attitudes of government following First and Second World Wars; reactions to nationalisation of aircraft industry; reasons for dominant position of US aircraft industry; retirement, 1966; nature of competition and co-operation between rival aircraft companies, 1920-1935; question of links with aircraft industry, 1983; comparison of Cruise missiles and V weapons. | Publisher: | http://www.iwm.org.uk | Source: | Imperial War Museum | Creator: | Smith, Lyn E | Identifier: | http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/o... | Go to resource |
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